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SOME POSSIBLE NEW FIELDS IN A NARROWING ACT
ROSS O'DONOGHUE*

Both Congress and the courts, particularly the Supreme Court,
have increasingly tended to narrow the scope of the Tort Claims Act,
but within these confines there are certain classes of torts, wellrecognized in the common law, which have been little used or totally
neglected as the basis for suits. It is the purpose of this paper to
suggest some of these and to consider their availability. Of course,
such speculation may prove faulty in some cases and overlook others
actually available. Prediction in law is a very risky business, so that
some of these suggestions will very likely not stand. In addition, some
mention will be made of those classes of persons who have now been
excluded from the benefits of the Act by Congressional or judicial
action.
Perhaps the most neglected classes are trespass, trover and conversion. In the case involving the greatest trespass of all, namely,
the seizure by order of President Truman of the steel plants,1
the steel companies obtained equitable relief rather than relief under
the Tort Act. But one of the defenses relied on by the Government
was that plaintiffs had an adequate legal remedy since if the seizure
was improper, it was tortious and relief would thus be available under
the Tort Act. The district court rejected this theory and held that
the Tort Claims Act was not applicable.2 Judge Pine reasoned that
since the seizure was carried out under an executive order it was
therefore within one of the exemptions of the Act3 as an act of an
employee of the Government in the execution of a regulation, whether
or not it be valid. The cases cited by the court in reference to this
proposition, Old King Coal Co. v. United States4 and Jones v. United
States,5 involved no question of illegal seizure, so that the decision
stands alone on this point.
It hardly seems reasonable that the impact of the Act could be so
neatly avoided by a mere delegation of authority. Can an executive
order made without reference to any Act of Congress be considered
a "regulation" within the meaning of the Tort Claims Act to defeat
the Act? Nearly every action could thus be delegated by "regula*Partner, O'Donoghue and O'Donoghue, Washington, D. C.
1. Exec. Order No. 10340, 17 FED. REG. 3139 (1952).

2. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569, 577 (D.D.C.
1952).
3. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680 (a) (1950).
4. 88 F. Supp. 124 (S.D. Iowa 1949).
5. 89 F. Supp. 980 (S.D. Iowa 1949).
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tion" and the purpose of the Act stultified. Clearly the seizure was
in every sense the act of the President, and if it was without authority
it was tortious. Even under the ordinary principles of trespass or
agency, a principal is liable in trespass if he directs his agent to commit the trespass even if the principal is not present when it occurs. 6
The action of the executive himself on behalf of the United States
would therefore seem to have been plainly actionable in trespass
under the Tort Claims Act. The question is not adverted to in the
8
opinion of either the Court of Appeals7 or the Supreme Court.
The main reliance by the Government in the Supreme Court to
avoid equitable relief in the Steel Seizure Cases was on the right of
the steel companies to obtain compensation in the Court of Claims
rather than under the Tort Claims Act, but the Court stated that
"Prior cases in this Court have cast doubt on the right to recover in
the Court of Claims on account of properties unlawfully taken by
government officials for public use as these properties were alleged
to have been. See e.g., Hooe v. United States, 218 U.S. 322, 335-336;
United States v. North American Co. 235 U.S. 330, 333."'sa The Government had pointed to United States v. Pewee Coal Co.sb to show

.that compensation was obtainable in the Court of Claims, but if the
Supreme Court has doubts as to efficacy of such relief, it seems reasonable to suppose that a suit under the Tort Claims Act is an indicated
remedy. This is not to question the propriety of the Supreme Court's
decision, since it may well be that such an action would not be an
adequate legal remedy, but only to suggest that it was an available
one.
Another class of cases involving trespass which would not seem
excluded by any specific exception in the Act is in the broad field
of search and seizure. An illegal search and seizure when performed
by federal agents appears actionable, and a search or seizure without
a warrant 9 or on an invalid warrant o are clearly illegal. Of course,
there is the exemption of actions based on "abuse of process" contained
in Section 2680 (h) 11 but abuse of process usually means the malicious
perversion of a regularly issued process whereby a result not lawfully
12
or properly attainable under it is secured.
6. Chirac v. Reinicker, 11 Wheat. 280, 6 L. Ed. 474 (U.S. 1826).
7. Sawyer v. United States Steel Co., 197 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
8. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 Sup. Ct. 863,
96 L. Ed. 1153 (1952).

8a. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585, 72 Sup. Ct.

863, 96 L. Ed. 1153 (1952).

8b. 341 U.S. 114, 71 Sup. Ct. 670, 95 L. Ed. 809 (1951).
9. McClurg v. Brenton, 123 Iowa 368, 98 N.W. 881 (1904); Smith v. McDuffee, 72 Ore. 276, 142 Pac. 558, rehearing denied, 143 Pac. 929 (1914).
10. State v. Griswold, 67 Conn. 290, 34 Atl. 1046 (1898); Fisher v. McGirr,
1 Gray 1, 61 Am. Dec. 381 (Mass. 1854).
11. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(h) (1950).
12. Italian Star Line v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp.,
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A still further type of case which sounds in trespass and of which
there seems to be a dearth under the Tort Claims Act is that involving
the comparatively modern tort of invasion of privacy. Needless to say,
most of the great invasion of the individual's privacy by the Federal
Government in this day and age is pursuant to statute and accordingly not actionable. But there may be some areas where the invasion has not been authorized and would thus be tortious. An obvious
example is wiretapping. There is little doubt that wiretapping, like
eavesdropping, 13 is an actionable invasion of privacy,14 even though
this may not be a violation of the Fourth Amendment 0 or a violation
of Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act.'0
But although wiretapping may not be forbidden by the Constitution
or any law, it is not permitted by any. Since the United States has
not by act of Congress indicated any intention to limit its liability
for this tort by permitting any government agents to indulge in wiretapping, it would seem that its responsibility would be the commonlaw liability of the individual. Surely in the Goldman and the Coplon
cases6a the tort was committed with what appears to have been substantial damages. Perhaps the damages inherent in a jail sentence
would be compensable as the result of a conviction obtained through
leads obtained through wiretapping.
Although it has generally been held that photographing or finger
printing arrested persons even where they are not found guilty or
even charged is not an actionable invasion of privacy,' 7 yet the
publication of such pictures as in a wanted notice in a Post Office' 8
might be so considered.
Similar to the liability in trespass that may arise from illegal
search and seizure by law enforcement officers is the liability in
trover that may result from negligent handling of property beyond
the scope of the writ under which it is seized. Thus there is liability
in trover for the wrongful seizure of the property of one person
53 F.2d 359, 80 A.L.R. 576 (2d Cir. 1931); Melton v. Rickman, 225 N.C. 700,
36 S.E.2d 276, 162 A.L.R. 793 (1945).
13. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68, 69
L.R.A. 101 (1905); State v. Davis, 139 N.C. 547, 51 S.E. 897 (1905); Warren
and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
14. Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931). And see cases cited
in Notes, 138 A.L.R. 22, 94 (1942), 168 A.L.R. 446, 463 (1947), 14 A.L.R.2d.
750, 761, 770 (1950).
15. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 62" Sup. Ct. 993, 86 L. Ed. 1322
(1942).
16. 47 U.S.C.A. § 605 (Supp. 1953); Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749
(D.C. Cir. 1949).
16a. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 62 Sup. Ct. 993, L. Ed. 1322
(1942); Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
17. Notes, 168 A.L.R. 446, 461 (1947), 14 A.L.R.2d 750, 761, 770 (1950).
18. Notes, 138 A.L.R. 22, 66 (1942), 168 A.L.R. 446, 456 (1947), 14 A.L.R.2d
750, 768 (1950).
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under legal process directed to another, or in the seizure of property
in excess of that called for by the writ.19 The failure of a sheriff
to file a return of his proceedings in a claim and delivery action within
the number of days required by statute has been held to render him
liable in conversion to the owners for the value of the property at
the time of his seizure of it even though he applies the proceeds to
20
the benefit of his creditor without his consent.
Although liability on the part of the marshal and his surety no
doubt still exists in such cases, there seems to have been no judicial
determination of how much if any of this liability has been assumed
21
by the United States under the Tort Claims Act. Section 2680 (c)
exempts "any claim arising in respect of .. .the detention of any
goods . . . by . . . any . . . law-enforcement officer," and Section
2680 (h) 22 exempts "[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false
imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process,
libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract
rights," but "abuse of process" is not generally considered to mean
negligent seizure of, or failure to seize property under a writ, and
there are many instances where the complaint against the marshal
is not merely for "the detention of goods." Trover will lie, for example where the marshal illegally sells the property of an execution
debtor for the full value of the property although the marshal pays
23
over to the execution creditor the proceeds of the sale.
In the only case touching on these points decided under the Act 24
the complaint alleged that agents of the Alcohol Tax Unit of the
Treasury Department seized liquor without a valid order, turned
some of it over to a person claiming to be the owner, and that more
of it was missing when the court ordered it returned to her. The
court dismissed the complaint on the basis of both the exemptions in
Section 2680 (c)and (h) as arising out of "the detention of. . . goods
or merchandise by... law-enforcemeAt officer" 25 and also if plaintiff's
theory was correct the agents were guilty of "abuse of process."28
Presumably in this case the Treasury agents secured the search
warrant from the United States Commissioner and also apparently
detuined and failed to return the goods, but where a marshal acted
negligently under valid process and his negligence did not directly
19. Yockey v. Smith, 181 Ill. 564, 54 N.E. 1048 (1899); Woodbury v. Long,
8 Pick. 543 (Mass. 1829).
20. Shaffner v. Price, 63 S.D. 456, 260 N.W. 703, 98 A.L.R. 689 (1935).
21. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(c) (1950).
22. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(h) (1950).
23. Hall v. Ray, 40 Vt. 576, 94 Am. Dec. 440 (1868).
24. Chambers v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 601 (D. Kan. 1952).
25. 28 U.S.CA. § 2680 (c)(1950).
26. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680 (h) (1950).
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involve the detention of goods, there might well be liability on the
part of the United States.
Although there have been no definite cases of conversion or trover
under the Tort Claims Act, one sounding in trover is to be found in
Aktiebolaget Bofors v. 'United States. 27 The United States had been
licensed by the Swedish owners to manufacture "for the United
States' use" the famous Bofors 40 mm. anti-aircraft gun. Despite the
protest of the owners, the United States manufactured it also for the
use of its allies. Thereafter, the owners brought several simultaneous
suits based on various theories, against the United States and officers
thereof, including one suit under the Tort Claims Act, where, as
Judge Holtzoff said: "Specifically the question presented is whether
a person to whom a secret process is lawfully disclosed in connection
with a license to use it, is guilty of a tortious act if he uses the process
beyond the scope of the license. '28 The Court of Appeals held that
"a licensee who uses the secret for purposes beyond the scope of the
license granted by the owner is liable for breach of contract, but he
commits no tort, because the only right of the owner which he thereby
invades is one created by the agreement for disclosure." 29 Somewhat
similar to this case is Fulmer v. United States3 o in which the court
decided that no tort was involved in using an unpatented invention.
Since Section 1498 of the Judicial Code confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Court of Claims for suits alleging patent infringements by
the United States, there can be no suits of this kind under the Tort Act.
But there seems no reason why suits for the infringement of copyright may not lie under the Act. Furthermore, this may well be a
very important field in this day when the Government is using such
large quantities of literary and scientific material in its vast output of
publications, foreign radio broadcasts, etc. A case now pending in
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Turton v. United States
(Civil No. 11979), involves the violation of a copyright by the United
States. The district court denied the complaint for an injunction and
damages sought under the Copyright Laws on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the theory that the United States had not consented
to be sued. That is the Government's position on appeal. But there
seems to be no good reason why a suit for damages would not lie
under the Tort Claims Act for a violation of copyright is undoubtedly
a tort which it not covered by any of the exceptions in the Act.
Another possible source of claims under the Act would be in
negligent handling of cases for private persons by United States
27.
28.
29.
30.

194 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cr. 1951).
Aktiebolaget Bofors v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 131, 132 (D.D.C. 1950).
Aktiebolaget Bofors v. United States, 194 F.2d 145, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
83 F. Supp. 137 (N.D. Ala. 1949).
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Attorneys where they are required (by statute) to act for an individual. There are many cases under the Act involving malpractice of
government physicians and surgeons but apparently none involving
the malpractice of a government attorney. Although this may reflect
the high degree of care used by United States Attorneys in the handling of cases, one might expect eventually malpractice suits involving
the representation of private individuals under the several statutes
which require such representation. Some examples of these statutes
are: (1) that requiring the representation upon request of persons
sued "for or on account of anything done by him while an officer of
either House of Congress in the discharge of his official duty, in executing any order of such House . . Y,;s' (2) the representation of
Indians in all suits at law and in equity "In all States and Territories
where there are reservations or allotted Indians ..."2 and (3) the
representation of veterans in claims against employees for reemployment.P It is also true that both before and after the Tort Act,
United States Attorneys have acted on behalf of Government employees sued for torts committed in the course of their employment.
An order of the Attorney General permits such representation. Even
after the enactment of the Act, these persons are often sued either
alone, for a tort which would be actionable under the Act, or as co3 4
defendant with the United States.
It is not necessary to point out the many possibilities of negligence
once the attorney-clinent relationship is established. Ignorance of
the law, neglect through press of official duties, etc., may all give rise
to a cause of action which would appear to be cognizable under the
Tort Claims Act.
The foregoing are some of the types of torts which have not yet been
litigated under the Federal Tort Claims Act, but which nevertheless
involve well-known classes of torts. Although some are so exceptional
in nature that it is not surprising that no suits have yet arisen involving them, others are so much in the field of federal activity that it is
difficult to account for the lack of any cases thereon more than nine
years after the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act.
31. 2 U.S.C.A. § 118 (1927).
32. 25 U.S.C.A. § 175 (1928).
33. 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 459 (d)(1951).
34. The advantage of naming a driver of a Government vehicle involved
in a collision is seen, for example, under Rule 43 (b), FED. R. Civ. P. As an
adverse party, the plaintiff can "interrogate him by leading questions and
contradict and impeach him" which would otherwise be impossible since, as
a Government employee, he is neither "an officer, director, or managing agent
of a public or private corporation or a partnership or association which is
an adverse party." An advantage of suing the driver alone is to avoid the
often crowded federal courts and to obtain the more summary and often
cheaper relief of state or municipal courts. If a judgment is obtained and not
paid, the defendant's driver's license in many jurisdictions will be revoked.
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While there may be some persons who have overlooked claims that
would be cognizable under the Tort Act, there are certain other classes
who have sought to assert claims only to have them rejected by the
courts.
In the great class of cases where the United States has provided
other means of compensation as for soldiers, federal employees and
veterans, the courts have finally come to exclude recovery under the
Tort Act. That the proposition may not be quite as simple as this
appears in Brooks v. United States,5 for the Court permitted recovery by a soldier who had been injured by a federal vehicle while
he was on leave. Despite the fact of compensation and free hospitalization for his injuries, the Court held that since the injuries were
not received as an incident to his army service he was not only not
prevented from suing but not even required to elect his remedy. It
did concede that in measuring damages the Court should take into
account the compensation received.
Although Feres v. United States 6 paid lip service to Brooks, it
was decided on a theory which would have precluded Brooks' recovery
and therefore seems effectively to have overruled the prior decision.
Although both Feres and the two other soldiers in the companion
cases to it were on active duty at the time of their injuries, the
rationale of the decision is that where the United States has provided
an adequate system of compensation, Congress tacitly intended to
37
exclude recovery under the Tort Claims Act.
The later decision in Johansen v. United States,8 although not involving the Tort Claims Act, is in keeping with this theory, for it
held the remedies for seamen on vessels of the United States are to
be found exclusively in the Federal Employees' Compensation Act of
1916, 39 and the remedies under the Public Vessels Act of 192540 are

therefore not available.
This principle, once established, was extended to other areas. For
example, veterans injured in veterans' hospitals who were thus entitled to compensation, were held not entitled to sue under the Tort
Act. Prior to the Feres decision, the First Circuit in Santana v. United
States,41 in reliance on the Brooks case, held that the family of a
veteran could recover under the Tort Act even though "already covered by a 'comprehensive system of special statutory benefits' ,,42
35. 337 U.S. 49, 69 Sup. Ct. 918, 93 L. Ed. 1200 (1949).
36. 340 U.S. 135, 71 Sup. Ct. 153, 95 L. Ed. 152 (1950).
37. See also Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 31 n.25, 73 Sup. Ct. 956,
97 L. Ed. 1427 (1953).
38. 343 U.S. 427, 72 Sup. Ct. 849, 96 L. Ed. 1051 (1952).
39. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 751 et seq. (1927).
40. 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 781 et seq. (1944).
41. 175 F.2d 320 (1st Cir. 1949).
42. Id. at 322.
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while after the Feres case, and in reliance thereon, the Court of Ap43
peals for the District of Columbia held in O'Neil v. United States
that in identical circumstances, there could be no recovery. To the
same effect is Pettis v. United States.4
Similarly, in Wham v. United States45 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, between the Brooks and Feres cases, and in
reliance on Brooks, allowed recovery under the Tort Act to a member
of the Metropolitan Police Force for the District of Columbia despite
a system of compensation to which the United States contributed;
whereas, in Lewis v. United States,48 decided after the Feres decision,
the same court denied the availability of the Act to a member of the
U. S. Park Police of the same city, on the Feres theory, while attempting to distinguish their decision in the Wham case.
Originally, too, federal employees were held not to be excluded
from the benefits of the Tort Act simply by reason of a system of
compensation provided by the Federal Employees Compensation Act.
So in White v. United States,47 the court held that the Federal Employees' Compensation Act was not an exclusive remedy and permitted suit under the Tort Act. Whether this would have been
changed by the doctrine of the Feres case alone cannot be told since
Congress by its 1949 amendment to the FECA made the Compensation Act exclusive 8 and retroactive. 49 The defense of exclusiveness,
however, was rejected in Dishman v. United States50 on the ground
that the particular injury to the plaintiff was not received "while in
the performance of his duty." But in general, this great source of
liability has now been removed from the Act.

Federal prisoners have also been held to be without redress by the
several District Courts which have passed on the question. 51 In
Sigmon v. United States52 Judge Barksdale has discussed the whole
problem in great detail. To some extent the rationale of the Feres
case concerning other compensation is available, with respect to prisoners working under Federal Prison Industries5 3 since the statute

43. 202 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1953).

44. 108 F. Supp. 500 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
45. 180 F.2d 38 (D.C. Cir. 1950).

46. 190 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1951).

47. 77 F. Supp. 316 (D.N.J. 1948).

48. 63 STAT. 861 (1949), 5 U.S.C.A. § 757 (b) (Cum. Supp. 1950).
49. Act of October 14, 1949, § 303 (g), 63 STAT. 867 (1949).
50. 93 F. Supp. 567 (D. Md. 1950).

51. Shew v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 1 (M.D.N.C. 1953); Sigmon v. United
States, 110 F. Supp. 906 (W.D. Va. 1953); Dayton v. United States, D. Kan.,
Topeka, Oct. 13, 1950; Ellison v. United States, W.D.N.C. The last two cases
cited are unreported, but are referred to in the Sigmon case, 110 F. Supp.
906, at 909.
52. 110 F. Supp. 906 (W.D. Va. 1953).

53. Federal Prison Industries is the Government corporation which administers the program under which inmates of federal penal and correctional
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provides that funds shall be used for "compensation to inmates or
their dependents for injuries suffered in any industry. In no event
than that provided in
shall compensation be paid in greater amount
'5 4
the Federal Employees' Compensation Act.

In the 33 Federal penal and correctional institutions, there were,
during 1952, an average of 18,176 inmates. 5 The guiding principle of
the Bureau of Prisons is that "the most effective tool in the rehabilitation of prisoners is useful and constructive work."50 The Bureau
therefore reports that two thirds of the prisoners are employed at
farm work, on road construction and forestry operations, on construction projects, and at the many bases incident to the operation and
maintenance of the institutions. About 12% are unemployable for
one reason or another. The remainder, 3,770 in 1952, are employed
57
by Prison Industries.
It is therefore apparent that the large majority of federal prisoners
are not employed by Prison Industries and even those who are spend
a large portion of their time in prison not engaged "in any industry"
but subject to the risk of tortious injury.
Prisoners can hardly be presumed to have "assumed the risk"
since that concept denotes voluntariness. Nor is there any indication
that Congress intended to exclude such claims. Whatever light the
legislative history throws on the subject indicates the contrary. s
In order to hold that injuries received outside the protection of
Prison Industries are not actionable under the Tort Claims Act, Judge
Barksdale resorted to that section of the Tort Claims Act which
provides that "The United States shall be liable, . . .in the same

manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
institutions may be employed in the production of commodities for consump-

tion in the institutions or for sale to departments or agencies of the United
States. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 4121-28 (1951).
54. 18 U.S.C.A. § 4126 (1951).
55. FEDERAL PRIONS, 1952, 5 (Federal Bureau of Prisons, 1952).
56. Id. at 23.
57. Ibid. There is a high turnover among these employees so that many
more persons are involved than the number indicates. The corporation suggests that at least double the cited number are employed during the year.
ANNUAL REPORT OF BoARi

OF DIRECTORS, FEDERAL PRISON

INDUSTRIES,

INc.,

FIScAL YEAR 1952, 1.

58. H.R. 17168, § 207, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (1931), provided: "The provisions
of this Title shall not apply to . . . (c) any claim by a prisoner while in a
Federal penal institution." This bill was reported favorably to the House
but no further action was taken. H.R. REP. No. 2800, 71st Cong., 3d Sess.
(1931). H.R. 5065 and S. 211, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), both provided in
§ 206: "The provisions of this Act shall not apply to ... (11) any claim for
injury to or death of a prisoner." No action was taken on these bills, but S.
4567, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), which contained the same exception was

reported favorably out of Committee, although no further action was taken.
SEN. REP No. 658, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932). In the 73d Congress three Tort
Claims bills were introduced, but only S. 1833 contained the exclusion of
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circumstances.... ."9 As the Supreme Court said in the Feres case:
"One obvious shortcoming in these claims is that plaintiffs can point
to no liability of a 'private individual' even remotely analogous to
that which they are asserting against the United States."6 0
So Judge Barksdale concluded that "[a] private individual would
never find himself 'under like circumstances' to those alleged in the
complaint, because no private individual has the legal right to hold
any other private individual in penal servitude."6' 1
This brings the problem back to that fascinating and still undecided
problem of the limits of the Federal Tort Claims Act which is beyond
the scope of this paper. Obviously, that provision carried to its logical
conclusion would exempt all torts committed in the performance of
governmental functions and restrict recovery to those injuries incurred as a result of proprietary activities of government. It seems
clear that such a rule appeals to the minority of the Supreme Court
in the Dalehite case, 62 and their criticism of the opinion of the Court
is that it restricts the limits of the Act beyond even this well-known
scope. Much more elucidation will be necessary before anyone can
say with confidence where the boundaries lie. 3
Thus it is seen that although there has been a constant narrowing
of the scope of the Act both by Congress and the Courts, there remain
within those narrowing confines rich veins as yet unassayed. Some
of those suggested by this paper may prove dross when subjected to
the acid tests of the Courts, but a diligent prospector should be able
to uncover rich and rewarding lodes.
prisoner claims. In the 74th Congress, two Tort Claims bills were introduced,
one of which, S. 1043, contained the exclusion. None of the Tort Claims bills
introduced in subsequent sessions of Congress excluded prisoner claims.
59. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674 (1950).
60. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141, 71 Sup. Ct. 153, 95 L. Ed. 152
(1950). This theory was reiterated with regard to the Coast Guard in Dalehite
v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 43-4, 73 Sup. Ct. 956, 97 L. Ed. 1427 (1953).
61. Sigmon v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 906, 910 (W.D. Va. 1953).
62. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 59-60, 73 Sup. Ct. 956, 97
L. Ed. 1427 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
63. Some lower court decisions still favor widening rather than restricting
the scope of the Act. See e.g., Union Trust Co. v. United States, 113 F. Supp.
80 (D.D.C. 1953) (opinion rendered before, but reargument had after the
Dalehite decision).

